Flaptekst

Contemporary epistemologists and philosophers of mind continue to debate the perplexing nature of our apparently privileged psychological self-knowledge -- the special, first-personal knowledge we are routinely taken to have of our own sensations, moods, emotions, beliefs, desires, memories, perceptions, thoughts, imaginings, and intentional actions. In Expression and Self-Knowledge, Dorit Bar-On and Crispin Wright engage in a sustained critical debate concerning the best approach for achieving a philosophical understanding of this type of knowledge. Their debate focuses pre-eminently on the expressivist idea that a satisfactory explanation will need to assign a leading role to our capacity to manifest our mental states in expressive behaviour and speech. In the first part of the book, the authors join to provide a penetrating critical overview of other existing approaches to privileged self-knowledge, before going on to present and debate their own contrasting views of its provenance. The discussion develops and addresses new criticisms of the expressivist approach, engaging broad issues in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, and offering divergent perspectives on the remarks on the issues in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Expression and Self-Knowledge incorporates cutting-edge research and offers invaluable insights on a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy. It is essential reading for epistemologists, philosophers of language and mind, psychologists with an interest in introspection, and all advanced students working in the area.