?In this broad-ranging, learned and lucidly written book R. offers an overview of the Stoic doctrine of ?moral progress? (prokopè) and its ?afterlife? in (Middle-)Platonism. The Stoics notoriously held that every man who is not perfectly wise remains an utter fool. They nevertheless - ?paradoxically?- also maintained that moral progress is possible. The book is divided into two parts. In the first the Stoic doctrine of progress is discussed. (?) Only life starting from un unconditionally affirmative attitude towards what is, is good; if not, it is bad. The transition from bad to good hence necessarily happens by an instantaneous radical change. The role of progress is to prepare for this change (p.29). (?) The section of Seneca is particularly noteworthy: it contains an excellent interpretation of ?Ep.? 75.8-14 and ?De tranq. an?2.1-3, offering a survey of the various classes of ?proficient? distinguished by Seneca. In the second part R. Deals with the reception of the doctrine by the most important of these critics, the (Middle-)Platonists. Not sharing the Stoics radical interpretation of the good life, they used the common-sense argument that someone who proceeds on the road to virtue can no longer be an utter fool. The Stoic dichotomy between fools and sages was hence rejected and replaced by a trachoma of fools, those who make progress, and sages. R. starts his discussion with Philo (Chapter 3), usually placed in the tradition of Platonism? (p.148), and ends with the handbook authors Alcinous and Apuleius (Chapter 5). The intermediate Chapter 4 deals with Plutarch, and turns out to be a commentary upon Plutarch?s treatise ?On becoming aware of progress in virtue?, ?the most important extant ancient text about the problem of moral progress? (p.10). (?) R.?s extensive running commentary is the first ever in English, and really forms the core of the book (pp.222-363). In the appendix a helpful elaborate structural plan of Plutarch?s treatise is added (pp.405-412). (?) The theme of the book thus turns out to be not so much reconstruction of the Stoic doctrine as such, but rather its reception by later Stoics and (Middle-)Platonist.? (RENÉ BROUWER in The Classical Review (New Series), 2007, pp.73-73).