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Barbara de Ruijter - Reductionism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. An evaluation.
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| Schrijver: | Barbara de Ruijter |
| Titel: | Reductionism and externalism in the philosophy of mind. An evaluation. |
| ISBN: | |
| Uitgever: | Rijksuniversiteit Groningen |
| Bijzonderheid: | 2005; zo goed als nieuw |
| Prijs: |
€ 5,00
€ 4,35
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| Meer info | Engelstalige samenvatting: This book combines two topics. First, there is the claim that our folk-psychology reduces to some future neuro-physiological or functional theory. Secondly, therc is the cr-rrrent trend of externalism. I argtre that the latter causes trouble for the former. If externalists are right, the "highest common factor" analysis of our psychological states that underlies the reductionist project is mistaken. This undermines the reductionist claim that our folk-psychological practice must either reduce or must be eliminated. The argument presented here offers a twist on Putnam's famous multiple realizability argument. According to Putnam's famous argument, psychological states can be realized in different ways. Differently realized psvchological states clualify as the same kind of psychoiogical state, say be'ing in pain, because' the'y share a common functional property. But what if we reject this assumption? What if a particular kind of psychological state, say the belief that it rains, is not characterized by a shared functional feature, or any other common non-psychological aspect? What if what counts as the same psychological state within our everydav practice makes up a rather diverse cate.gory? If so, this shows that our need tcl understand one another functions as a norm that allows us to group together divcrse states into the samc caregory. When we recognize the need to understand one another, we must admit that inter-theoretic relations come in more varieties and are a more complicated affair than some reductionists have assumed, to the extent that the reductionist framework only applies to a limited amount of cases. One case that falls outside its range is the relation between reductjonist theories about our psvchological states and our everyday folk-psychological practice. |
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